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LEGAL FORUM 
DIS,CRIMINATION IN FOCUS 
Peter Kiely and Andliew Caisley* 
Introducti~on 
In the fust two or three decades aft,er the Second World War there was a considerable 
movement internationally to address issues relating to the well being of people in the work 
force. Pan of this ov~erall thrust saw the development in many countries of comprehensive 
health and safety legislation of the type that New Zealand has just introduced.1 
Another thrust of this general "social justice" trend was a new ~emphasis on outlawing 
certain types of discrimination. This stemmed from the 1948 Universal Declara.tion of Human 
Rights2 and resulted in a number of international conventions, for example the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Fo1n1s of Racial Discrimination,3 and the United 
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.4 It also resulted 
in the introduction of "discrimination legislation" in many ~countries. 
This international trend finally reached New Zealand in the 1970s, resulting in the 
enactment of the Race Relations Act 1971, the Equal Pay Act 1972 and the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977.s 
In recent years the subjects of discrimination and sexual harassment have atuacted 
increasing public attention. Perhaps the most high profile ~case was the October 1991 "trial" 
of US Supreme Court Nominee, Clarence Thomas as a result of the allegations made by 
Professor Anita Hill that Thomas had discussed with her details of pornographic films and 
his own sexual prowess. In the light of this public discussion it is appropriate to consider the 
~current state of New Zealand law on discrimination, particularly in the employment setting. 
It is important to note that the common law never developed any protection against 
discrimination in the workplace, or in any other area of human activity. 'The only protections 
against discrimination are those laid down by statute, and these are not limited to the 
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Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 
Adopted by 'the Uniled Nations in 1948 
Adopted by the UN in 1965, and ratified by NZ in 1972 
Adopted and proclaimed by the UN in 1967 
The 'thfee principal anti-discrimination statutes were briefly augmented by the Employment Equity Act 
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employment relationship, but also cover such matters as the provision of goods and services, 
accommodation, advertising, and access to public places. 
·N·ew Zealand's present anti-discrimination law is contained in the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, and the Race Relations Act 1971 and the Human Rights Commission Act 
1977.6 These three statutes are largely overlapping and the Courts have adopted a unifotm 
approach to them. It is convenient therefore to consider in detail the Employment Contracts 
Act provisions on discrimination and sexual harass·ment since this Act contains the most 
fecent legislative enshrinement of the common ideals, and then briefly consider the important 
differences in the other two statutes and £uture developments which may occur. 
Employment Contracts A~ct provisions on discrimination 
The law does not prohibit discrimination at large., or discrimination in the popular 
sense. It is only specific types of behaviour in specific situations which are expressly 
prohibit·ed. Therefore, in order to understand the N~ew Zealand law on discrimination it is 
necessary to consider the statutory provisions in some detail. 
Pursuant to s27(l)(c) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, an employee may hav.e 
a personal grievance where an employee has been "discriminated against". That te1n1 is 
defined in s28 of the Act: 
" ... an employee is discriminated against ... if the employee's employer or a representative 
of that employer -
(a) Re~uses or omits to offer or afford to that employee the same tenns of 
employment, conditions of work, fringe benefits, or opportunities for 
training, promotion, and transfer as are made available for other ·employees 
of the same or substantially similar ,qualifications, experience, or skiDs 
employed in the same or substantially similar circumstances; or 
(b) Dismisses that employee or subjects that ,employee to any detriment, in 
circumstances in which other employees employed by that employer on 
work of that description are not or would not be dismissed or subjected to 
such detriment-
by reason of the colour, race, ethnic or national origins, sex, mariral status, or religious or 
ethical belief and/or age of that ·employee or by reason of that employee's involvement in 
the activities of an employees organisation". 
'The definition has two operative components. For discrimination to occur the employer must: 
6 
(a) make a decision in one of five broad areas, namely: 
(i) r~ecruitment; 
(ii) offering te1 tns and benefits; 
(iii) promotion and transfer; 
(iv) training; 
( v) dismissal or detriment; and 
(b) that decision must be influenced by a consideration of one of six factors, 
There is also the Equal Pay Act 1972, which abolished gender based wage differentials in industrial awards but 
this is of less practical significance now and accordingly is not considered further. 
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namely: 
(i) colour, race, ethnic or national origin 
(ii) sex 
(iii) marital status 
(iv) religious or ethical beliefs 
(v) employee organisation involvement 
(vi) age 
Each of these six factors warrants separate consideration. 
Colour, race, ethnic or national origins 
The leading case in this area is Hwnan Rights Commission v Mc~Carthy.1 The 
decision arose as a result of a complaint under the Race Relations Act, when 
employees of a clutch ~epair garage made particularly derogatory and racially 
offensive ~comments to a Samoan customer. The Human Rights 'Commission 
successfully brought an action against the employees, the managing director and the 
company. 
Less extreme conduct may also amount to discrimination on g!iounds of race. 
The Human Rights ~Commission have, for example, indicated that discrimination may 
arise where cultural styles of d.fess which do not confot rn to the "corporate image" are 
considefed inappropriate. 8 
Sex 
This ground of discrimination has given rise to some of the most widely 
publicised cases, and particularly Human Rights Commission v Air New Zealantf and 
Barry v NZ Fire Commission.1'0 
The Equal Opportunities Tribunal decision in Hwnan Rights Commission v Air 
New Zealand was the frrst opportunity the Tribunal had to invoke the procedures of 
the Human Rights Commission Act. In the landmark decision in December 1988, the 
Tribunal found that sex discrimination had oc~curred in the treatment of female cabin 
Cfew compared to male cabin crew, and the ability of females to obtain the same 
promotion and career path as their male colleagues. The Tribunal found that the 17 
female complainants had endured behaviour and incidents which ranged from 
indifference to extreme harassment of a sexist and at times racist nature and awarded 
damages for loss of salary, opportunity, annual leave and damag~es for humiliation and 
loss of di,gni ty. 
While the individual payouts to the women and the total amount of the 
settlement remained confidential, the company did agr~ee to meet the costs of the 
Human Rights Commission in ta1dng the case to the 'TribunaL These amounted to 
(1983) 3 NZAR 450 
Equal ,Opportunities Manual, Human Rights Commission 1989, p.31 
(1989) 2 NZELC 96,614 
10 Human Rights Com,mission, 28 January 1982 
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$303,858.00. 
In the same year, 1981, the case of Barry v NZ .Fire Commission arose. Mrs 
Barry applied to join the Fire Service and was turned down on the grounds that she 
·was below the minimum height requirement. 'The Human Rights Commission found 
that there was no minimum height required, and that she had in fact been rejected 
because of the all male tradition of the service. Mrs Barry was subsequently 
appointed to fire fighting duties. 
Marital status 
A recent illustration of discrimination on this grounds is provided by 
Proceedings ~Commissioner v NZ Post Ltd11 • NZ Post Ltd had a voluntary severance 
scheme which provided for a payment related to wages, together with a smaller 
percentage payment for the ~employee's spouse and for each dependent child. An 
·employee who was not married, and therefore did not receive the additional payment 
which marri·ed employees received, challenged the legality of the arrangement and it 
was held that it did amount to discrimination on the grounds of marital status since 
the complainant did not get the additional payment precisely because of his marital 
status, i.e., the fact that he was not married. 
Religious or ethical belief 
The leading case on discrimination on these grounds is Human Rights 
Commission v Eric Sides Motors12 ·where a Christian employer sought a Christian 
employee. As a result of the decision the Human Rights Commission Act was 
amended by the inclusion of s 15(7 A) allowing for preferential treatment based on 
religious belief in certain special circumstances . 
Union (employee organisation) involvement 
An illustration is provided by Post Office Union v Telecom13 where it was 
alleged that a union member ·who was not promoted because his "loyalty was suspect 
and he would require extensive training before he could take up the duties" was 
discriminated against because of his union involvement. However the union failed to 
discharge the burden of proof as it could not establish that on the balance of 
probabilities it ·was the ~employee's union involvement that caused the employer not 
to promote him. 
Age 
This ground of discrimination has been the subject of much public attention, 
and is currently making up 44% of all enquiries and inforrnal complaints to the 
Commission.14 The recent suggestion by the Commission that advertising for a 
"senior lecturer'' amounts to discrimination on the basis of age has been the subject 
(1992) NZAR 111 
(1981) 2 NZAR 447 
(1990) 3 NZELC 97,511 
Human Rights Commission Newsletter September 1992 p.2 
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of much controversy.1s The Commission has also indicated16 that they consider the 
following to be discriminatory,: 
"driver: must have at least five years experience" 
"school leavers required" 
"mature and experienced senior sales person" 
"wanted, youthful and energetic person'~~. 
'The frrst case under the new law has recently arisen. A public sector employer 
required two 60 year old employees to reilie, purely because they had turned 60. In 
a settlement mediated by the Human Rights Commission the employees received 
compensation totalling $26,500 .. 00.17 
Applicable legal principles 
From the discrimination ,cases over the last decade or so a number of general 
principles have ~emerged illustrating the approach taken by the Courts in discrimination cases. 
They are: 
The substantial or operative factor test 
In order for a person to be discriminated against on grounds of, for example, race, the 
employee must only prove that race was a "substantial or operative factor" in the making of 
the decision. 
This test was laid down in the decision of Human Rights Commission v Eric Sides 
Moto~s.18 The de£endant, a service station, advertised for a "keen Christian'' to work in the 
garage. A young man answered the advertisement and during a telephone conversa'tion was 
asked whether he went to chllfCh on Sundays. The applicant indicated that he did not, and 
was told by the proprietor that it was no use coming for an interview. 
The case took a rather unusual twist insofar as the defendant proprietor staunchly and 
vigorously maintained that he had a right to employ only "keen ~Christians", and that if he was 
faced with a choice between two applicants, one of whom was a Christian and one of whom 
was not he would always choose the Christian. Howev.er he maintained that on this particular 
occasion he made the decision not to employ the applicant because ~earlier in the conversation 
he had ascertained that the applicant had had a large number of jobs in relatively quick 
succession, and ther~efore appeared to be a highly unreliable and unsatisfactory employee. 
~On the evidence before it, the Coun found that it ·was not proved that the applicant's 
failure to attend church was an operative factor, and therefore it was held that this particular 
16 
11 
see, for example, nsenior Hits a Nerve .. NZ Herald 12 December 1992 
Human Rights Commission publication "Age Discrimination in E~mploy.ment- Guidelines for 
Advertisers" 
reponed in "Women Win Compo For Age Bias" NZ Herald 2 November 1992 
(1981) 2 NZAR. 447 
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element of discrimination had not been proved. However the imponant point of principle to 
emerge from the case was the ~establishment of the ''substantial or operative factor" test. 
'The characteristic need not be the only factor 
Although the grounds on which discrimination is alleged must be "a substantial or 
operative factor" it does not have to be the only factor. It is sufficient if it is a factor in the 
decision, regardless of whether there were other considerations as well. This is illustrated by 
what has become known as the "gender plus" test from sexual discrimination cases. 
Situations have arisen where an employer has made sexual advances to an employee, 
and when those advances have been rebuffed the employee has been dis·missed. Employees 
have challenged such tetnlinations and the defence has been mounted that the employee was 
not discriminated against because of their gender per se, but rather because they were 
attractive. 
This defence has been tried in a number of countries, and in New 'Zealand the I~eading 
decision is H v E19• The judgement in that case included a substantial review of US,20 
Canadian/1 Australian22 and British23 law on this area, all of which adopts the same 
approach. The Court decided that New Zealand law should follow the overseas authorities, 
and where the basis for the decision was the gender of the employee plus some other factor 
there could still be discrimination on grounds of sex. In other words the employer's conduct 
was still discrimination on the grounds of sex despite the fact that he would not have treated 
all female employees the same way; the employee had to be female and sexually attractive 
to the employer. 
Discrimination may be direct or indirect 
Discrimination may be either direct or indirect, although of course., major evidentiary 
difficulties arise in fespect of indirect discrimination. This issue most frequently arises in 
respect of fecruitment situations. It is unlawful, and a personal grievance may arise, where 
an employer advertises a position or selects applicants for a position on the basis of some 
factor which has the effect of discriminating on one of the grounds prohibited even though 
it does not ~expressly do this. 
Situations where this ·might arise include, for example, imposing a ·minimum height 
requirement on employees, where there is no real requirement for this. This has the obvious 
effect of indirectly discriminating against women who tend on average to be shorter. 
19 
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( 1985) 5 NZAR 333 
for example, Bundy v Jackson [24 EDP 31,4391] 
for example, Giouvanoudis v Golden Fleece RestauranJ & Anor 5 Canadian Human Rights Reporter 
Decision No.339 
for example, O'Callaghan v Loder & Anor (1984) EOC 92,023 
for example, 11urley v Mustoe [1981] l RLR 4 
-Discrimination in Focus 365 
However, where a particular skill is a requirement of the job, the inclusion of that factor in 
the selection eriteria may not be indirect discrimination. For ~example, a fntn which has a 
large Chinese client base may require fluency in Mandarin from its employees ~even though 
this may discriminate in favour of ~Chinese employees.. Obviously, however, there are no 
general tests in this area and each case will depend on its own facts. 
Inconv,enience is no defence 
It is not a de£ence for an employer to say that the rest of the work force would not 
accept an employee of a particular gender or race,. 
In Hwnan Rights Commission v Ocean Beach Freezing Co LttfA the Union and the 
males on the killing chain threatened to walk out and cause widespread industrial disruption 
if any females were given jobs on the killing ,chain. When the matter was challenged it was 
found that the women had been unlawfully discriminated against and the employer was 
orde~ed to pay damages to the women. 
Sexual harassment 
By the ,employer 
Like discrimination, sexual harassment has a specific statutory definition in respect of 
employment law. Any particular fact situation may also involve the commission of other 
crimes or torts, where the el~ements required may be different. However, sexual harassment 
by an employer as defined in the Employment Contracts Acf-S is: 
" ... an employ,ee is sexually harassed in that employee's employment if that ~employee's 
employer or a representative of that employer-
(a) Makes a request for sexual intercourse, sexual contact. or other fonn of 
sexual activity which contains-
(b) 
(i) ,An implied or overt promise of p~eferential treatment in that 
employee's employment; or 
(ii) An implied or oven threat of detrimental treatment in that 
employee's ~employment; or 
(iii) An implied or oven threat about the present or future employment 
status of that employee; :Q! 
By-
(i) The use of words (whether written or spoken) of a sexual nawre; 
or 
(ii) Physical behaviour of a sexual nature, -
subjects the employee to behaviour which is unwelcome or offensive to that 
employee (whether or not that is conveyed 'to the ~employer or 
representative) and which is either re~ or of such a significant nature 
that it has a delrimental ,effect on that employee's ,employment, job 
perfonnance, or job satisfaction. (emphasis added) 
(1981) 2 NZAR 451 
s29 
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The essential concern is with abuse of power rather than sex per se, the heart of the 
definition being that sexual harassment occurs where an employer or a representative of the 
employer mak~es a request for some fotrn of sexual activity which is linked with some 
promise or threat. 
The request can be by wonls, or by physical behaviour which is: 
(i) unwelcome or offensive; and 
(ii) either repeated .Q[ so significant that it has a detrimental effect on the employee's employment, 
job performance or job satisfaction. 
By co-workers or customers 
A second limb of sexual harassment is defined in section 36 and deals with harassment 
by fellow employees or customers or clients. 
"(I) Where-
( a) 
(b) 
A request of the .kind described in section 29(l)(a) of this Act is :made to 
an ~employee; or 
An employee is subjected to behaviour of the kind described in Section 
29(l)(b) of this Act-
by a person .. . who is in the employ . .. or who is a customer or client of the ... employer, 
the employee may make a complaint in writing ... 
(2) The employer or representative, on receiving a complaint ... 
(a) Shall inquire into the facts; and 
(b) If satisfied that such a request was :made or that such behaviour took place-
shall take whatever steps are practicable to prevent any repetition of such a request 
or of such behaviour. 
(3) Where any person, being a person in relation to whom an employee has made a 
complaint under subsection (1) of this section-
(a) Either-
(t>) 
(i) 
(ii) 
Makes to that employee after the complaint a request of the kind 
described in Section 29(1 )(a) of Ibis .Act; a 
Subjects that employee after the complaint 'to behaviour of the 
kind described in section 29(l)(b) of this Act; and 
The employer of that employee or a representative of that employer has not 
taken whatever steps are practicable to prevent the repetition of such a 
request or such behaviour-
that employee shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act and for the purposes of any 
employment contract to have a personal grievance by virtue of having been sexually 
h sed It .arn.s ' .•. 
The distinguishing feature is that in such cifcumstances there is no necessity for there 
to be an implied promise or threat. There need only be a request for some fotrn of sexual 
activity or conduct which is unwelcome or offensive and repeated or detrimental to the 
employee's employment, job perfonnance, or job satisfaction. However a personal grievance 
will not arise immediately, but only if the employee makes a written ,complaint, the conduct 
occurs again and the employer has not taken all practicable steps to prevent the repetition. 
Sexual harassment can include a vast range of activities, ranging from rape through 
to persistent sexual jokes or innuendo. One of the difficulties with this area is that 
perceptions of what is "fun" or "acceptable"' and what is "harassment" vary so widely. This 
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is illustrated by a recent Time/CNN survey .26 
Do you think sexual harassment occurs when a 
man who is a woman's boss or supervisor: 
Flins with the woman 
Makes remarks to her that contain sexual 
references or double meanings 
Frequently puts his ann around her 
shoulders or back 
Insists on telling sexual jokes to her 
Insists an discussing pornographic acts with her 
Pressures her to go out to dinner with him 
Asks her to have sex with him 
Yes 
41% 
80% 
64% 
74% 
91% 
77% 
87% 
The Human Rights Commission has provided a list of examples of sexual 
harassment27 which includes: 
- personally offensive verbal comments; 
- sexual or smutty jokes; 
- repeated ,comments or teasing about a person's alleged sexual activities or 
private life; 
- persistent, unwelcome social invitations or telephone calls from worknaates at 
work or at home; 
- being followed horne from work; 
- offensive hand or body gestures; 
- physical contact such as patting, pinching, touching or putting an ann around 
another person's body at work; 
- provocative posters with a sexual connotation; 
- sexual assault and rape. 
A recent illustration is provided by Fulton v Chiat Day Mojo Ltd?~ The applicant 
was employed by the respondent as a receptionist When she was employed she was warned 
about the "off beat" nature of the workplace sense of humour. During the course of her 
employment she was induced to page non-existent people with names which amounted to 
26 Time "Office Crimes" 21 October 1992 p.30 
n Sexual Harassment in the Worlcplace Human Rights Commission 1991 p.6 
[ 1992] 2 ERNZ 38 
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"phonetic obscenities". She complained to her employer about this sexual harassment. The 
offending staff were spoken to about the behaviour and she was reassured that it would not 
be repeated. 
Soon afterwards the applicant was given a letter by her employer stating some 
~concerns about her work perfo1rnance. She noted that the sexual harassment had an effect 
on her work, and her employer suggested that she was over reacting to a joke. She was asked 
why she continued with the job, and the following day she resigned. 
The Employment 'Tribunal at Auckland held that the wonls complained of constituted 
sexual harassment as they were of a sexual nature, unwelcome and offensive and were 
detrimental to her work. However, as the employer had taken all practicable steps to prevent 
the reoccurrence of such harassment the applicant had no personal grievance against the 
employer. 
It was held, however, that the applicant was constructively dismissed since the 
respondent made it plain that the jokes were amusing and remained amusing. By condoning 
the offensive behaviour, even afier taking steps to prevent its reoccurrence, the respondent 
effectively told the applicant that she ought to accept such behaviour, and in such 
~circumstances her resignation amounted to a constructive dismissal. 
Employer's obligation of fairness 
The employer is, in many respects, in a "double jeopardy" situation in respect of 
allegations of sexual misconduct. Not only must the employer be fair to the employee 
allegedly being harassed, but must also be fair to the employee allegedly harassing. 
In B v NZ Amalgamated Engineering Union29 an employer dismissed an employee 
for misconduct following complaints of sexual harassment by two of his femal~e work 
colleagues. The incident complained of was an exchange of ·words betw~een the complainant 
and Mr B., followed by Mr B taking hold of the complainant around her shoulders, pulling 
her towards him and attempting to kiss her, or actually kissing her (the facts were in dispute). 
The words complained of were to the effect that Mr B had seen the complainant with another 
employee walking ann in ann and flirting madly. 
Mr B was put on notice of instant dismissal if the allegations were established. The 
employer undertook an investigation and concluded that the words used were of a sexual 
nature, and the physical conduct was both unwelcome and offensive and that such conduct 
amounted to sexual harassment. .Mr B was accordingly dismissed. 
The employee challenged his dismissal and the Employment Tribunal at Auckland held 
that the conduct complained of did not amount to sexual harassment within the meaning of 
the Act. The conduct \vas offensive and contained a sexual dimension and may even have 
~constituted indecent assault, but the Tribunal found that it had not been established that the 
conduct was of such a degree as to have a detrimental affect on the employee's employment. 
The dismissal was found to be both substantiv~ely and procedurally unfair. The Court 
further noted that even if the conduct complained of had amounted to sexual harassment, 
dismissal would have been an inappropriate fo1n1 of discipline. This was because there were 
other options such as a final warning, counselling or opportunity to apologise and some or 
all of these would have been more appropriate. 
[19921 2 ERNZ 554 
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Hu·ma·n Rights Commission Act and Race Relations Act 
'The statutory provisions concerning discrimination in the Human Rights Commission 
Act and Race Relations Act contain essentially the same provisions as those in the 
Employment ~Contracts Act. The Acts focus on decisions made in respect of recruinnent, 
tei rns and benefits of employment, promotion and transfer, training and dismissal. The 
combined effect of the two Acts is that the ~employer may not discriminate on grounds of 
colour, race, ethnic or national origins, sex, marital status, ~eligious or ethical belief or age. 
Thefe are certain limited exceptions for practical purposes, such as where it is a 
genuine requir~ement of a job that a person be of a particular sex.30 
'Thefe are also certain ~exceptions in the Human Rights Commission Act which allow 
"positive discrimination" in circumstances where the discrimination is undertaken in good 
faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons of a particular group where that group 
may reasonably be supposed to need assistance or advancement in order to achieve an equal 
place in the community?1 lt should be noted that these provisions do not avail an employee 
who wishes merely to maintain a particular gender balance within a team?2 
The principal difference between the Employment Contracts Act provisions and the 
Human Rights and Race Relations Act provisions is in the area of piUCedure and remedies. 
Pursuant to the E'mployment Contracts Act an employee alleging discrimination or 
sexual harassment has access to the personal grievance proceedings, and the remedi~es 
provided in the Act 
The only difference from Olidinary personal grievance remedies is that in cases of 
sexual harassment there is an additional remedy available. The Tribunal or Court is entitled 
to make recommendations to the ~employer concerning the action the employer should take 
in r~espect of the person who was guilty of the harassment.33 
Thelie is also an express provision that in cases of sexual harassment no account shall 
be taken of any evidence of the employee's sexual experience or reputation.34 
Under the Human Rights Commission Act and Race Relations Act the appropriate 
procedure is to refer the matter to the Humans Right Commission or Race Relations 
Conciliator who 1nay investigate the matter with a view to seeking a :settl~ement t.luough 
conciliation. If there is no settlement the matter may be referred to 'the Equal Opportunities 
Tribunal which bas similar remedial powers to 'the Employment TribunaL The most 
30 see, for ~example, s.15(3) Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
ll s29 Human Rights Com mission Act 1977 
32 Parr v Broadcasting Corporation of NZ (1987) 1 'NZELC '95.560 
33 s40(l )(d} Employmenl Contracts Act 
s36 E'mployment Contracts Act 1991 
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significant difference however is that reinstatement is not available as a remedy. 
An employee must elect which procedur~e to use, and cannot proceed both under the 
Employment Contracts Act and under the Human Rights Commission or Race Relations Act. 
Future developments 
Over two years ago a Bill was introduced to Parliament to amend the Human Rights 
Commission Act to extend the grounds on which discrimination would be unlawful to include 
age, health status, sexual orientation, pregnancy, political opinion, unemployment status, 
beneficiary status, family status, and the identity of a partner or relative. 
The age discrimination provisions were part of this Bill, but w~ere fast tracked and 
became law earlier this year.35 The other provisions are only now being revisited and at the 
present time are the subject of Parliamentary and public debate. 
The legal principles which ,guide the Courts in the area of discrimination are relativ.ely 
well settled and if any of the proposed new grounds of unlawful discrimination afe adopted 
it can be expected that the extension of existing principles to cover ·the new grounds will 
cause little difficulty. Of course the desirability of any such extension is a different matter 
and one worthy of serious, thorough and infotn1ed debate. 
3S Human Rights ·Commission Amendment Act 1992 
